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HOW TEXTUALISM HAS CHANGED THE
CONVERSATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
Jesse D.H. Snyder*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Justice Elena Kagan announced, “we’re all textualists now,” during
a lecture in November 2015 at Harvard Law School.1 That remark in
part reflected how far the textualist movement had come in the
Supreme Court since Justice Antonin Scalia began fomenting its
virtues as early as 1986.2 And it was a comment offered en passant
in a larger conversation without an air of triumphalism or poignant
lament. The comment also occurred just months after the Supreme
Court released King v. Burwell, in which the Court concluded that the
phrase “an Exchange established by the State,” when interpreted in
proper context to advance the overall statutory scheme, embraces a
broader meaning, whereby enabling the federal government to
establish exchanges as well.3 So when Justice Kagan made that
*

1.

2.
3.

2016–2017 Law Clerk to the Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr. of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 2015–2016 Law Clerk to the Honorable Jimmie V.
Reyna of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 2012–2013 Law Clerk to
the Honorable Jorge A. Solis of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. I earned my J.D., summa cum laude, from Texas Wesleyan University and my
B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy. I would like to thank the entire staff
of the University of Baltimore Law Review, including especially Caitlin A. Rayhart,
Matthew L. Allison, Adrianne C. Blake, Emily Schmidt, and Andrew Berg. I would
also like to give a warm shout-out to my wife, Amy, for her support and
encouragement.
The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
HARVARD LAW TODAY 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalialecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation/ (explaining that “the primary reason”
Justice Scalia will “go down as one of the most important, most historic figures in the
Court” is that he “taught everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently”);
id. at 8:28 (“I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just was not remotely true
when Justice Scalia joined the bench.”).
See generally id.
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we
must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former,
and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent
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statement, it was uncertain what she meant and to whom she was
referring. But in view of some of the dissents she joined in October
Term 2017, perhaps not even she understood the gravity of that
statement or how the Court constituted years later would instantiate
that idea.4
The first opinion released in October Term 2018 offers a blueprint
for what it means to be a textualist in the Supreme Court three years
after Justice Kagan’s remarks, and it offers a glimpse into what might
be the new norm for how the Court interprets statutes. This norm
demonstrates a interpretative shift from context and purpose to the
words themselves tout court.5 In Mount Lemmon Fire District v.
Guido, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg hemmed a circuit split in a crisp
8-to-0 decision, cabining the Court’s analysis to the statutory text to
decide whether public employees could sue state and local employers
of less than 20 employees on allegations of age discrimination.6 A
public fire district had laid off its two oldest firefighters and then
sought to dismiss an eventual lawsuit on the basis that the fire district
was too small to qualify as an “employer,” which federal law defined
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
twenty or more employees,” with the added proviso that “[t]he term
[employer] also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State
or political subdivision of a State . . . .”7 In a slip opinion barely
reaching the top of the seventh page, the unanimous decision all but
limited its focus to the text in deciding that the term “also” removes
the numerical requirement to be an employer under the statute.8
Passing reference to some enforcement evidence provided a coda to a
decision otherwise unabated by extratextual arguments.9 Perhaps

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we
adopt.
Id. at 2496.
See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1627 (2018) (“What all these
textual and contextual clues indicate, our precedents confirm. In many cases over
many years, this Court has heard and rejected efforts to conjure conflicts between the
Arbitration Act and other federal statutes.”); id. at 1638 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In
face of the NLRA’s text, history, purposes, and longstanding construction, the Court
nevertheless concludes that collective proceedings do not fall within the scope of § 7.
None of the Court’s reasons for diminishing § 7 should carry the day.”).
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2018) (“‘[T]wenty or more
employees’ is confining language, but the confinement is tied to § 630(b)’s first
sentence, and does not limit the ADEA’s governance of the employment practices of
States and political subdivisions thereof.”).
See id.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25–26.
See id. at 27.
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because of the quotidian context of the underlying dispute, the
decision received almost no press coverage.10
Yet contrasted with the interpretive approaches developed from the
founding through the 1970s, the analysis on display in Mount
Lemmon is a far cry from the once-commonplace, ubiquitous method
of interpreting statutes by distilling legislative intent through review
of a variety of sources, including the statutes themselves and
legislative history.11 Examining the disparity in methodology at
different time periods, the Court—albeit composed differently—no
longer appears to be doing the same thing.12 As between the epochs,
the players seem to be competing in different games, all of whom
most likely to lose if they take an intractable position from one era
and apply it to another.13 Social differences between the 1970s and
present day14 cannot explain these differences in full. But one
obvious agent of change, as Justice Kagan suggested at Harvard, is
the difference in how the justices have shifted the locus of
persuasion, and how zealous advocates have responded in kind.15
This paper argues that Mount Lemmon is a sleeper decision that
should receive greater appreciation and reflection because the method
of statutory interpretation on display seemingly caped a transition of
displacement from divining intent through a variety of sources—
including legislative history—to wholesale reliance on the statutory
text. That Mount Lemmon passed without comment shows how far
textualism has come in 30 years. In two parts, this article first
introduces how textualism as an interpretative method began to shape
10.
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.

See Edith Roberts, Wednesday Round-Up, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2018, 7:31 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/wednesday-round-up-447/.
See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey
of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298,
1302 (2018).
See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Legal Scholarship Highlight: Justice Scalia’s Textualist
Legacy, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2017, 10:48 AM), http://www.scotusblog
.com/2017/11/legal-scholarship-highlight-justice-scalias-textualist-legacy/ (describing
different approaches to and interpretations of the idea of textualism over the years
amongst the judiciary).
See, e.g., Bob Cohn, 21 Charts That Explain American Values Today, ATLANTIC
(June 27, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/21-charts-thatexplain-american-values-today/258990/.
See Siegel, supra note 13; see also Ron Collins, Ask the Author: Chief Judge
Katzmann on Statutory Interpretation, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 27, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/ask-the-author-chief-judge-katzmann-onstatutory-interpretation/.
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and take hold as a dominate approach to legal reasoning in the
Supreme Court.16 This article then examines how appellate courts,
without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s conclusive endorsement
of textualism, have approached the question presented in Mount
Lemmon.17 The final section studies Mount Lemmon and observes
what the decision means for litigants.18 Mount Lemmon enshrines a
break from decisions dating from the founding era through the 1970s,
making risible in the Supreme Court usage of once-unexceptionable
advocacy based on pragmaticism and extratextual considerations.
The decision shows that, for the mine-run of cases, the interpretative
process in the Supreme Court begins—and unless compelling reasons
counsel otherwise—ends with the text. The pendulum has swung,
and the movement appears to have reached a near-apex resting point.
Whether that resting point comes an inflection point toward
something else remains unanswered. Yet it should not be lost that
Mount Lemmon delivered a viable progressive victory to aggrieved
employees.19 So while textualism is generally extolled as a
conservative appellation,20 the right arguments can, in some cases,
produce victories no matter the cause.
II. HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS SHIFTED IN ITS
INTERPRETIVE METHODS
A. Extratextual Sources Complement the Understanding of
Statutory Text
The Supreme Court long has been comfortable with relying on a
variety of sources, including legislative history and other extratextual
evidence, to interpret statutes.21 As early as 1816, the Supreme Court
made clear that

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

21.

See infra Part II.
See infra Sections III.A–B.
See infra Section III.C.
See Mark Joseph Stern, The Gorsuch Brief, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2018, 6:29 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/nielsen-preap-aclu-neil-gorsuchbriefs.html; see also Howard Fischer, US Supreme Court Says Mount Lemmon Fire
District Can Be Sued for Age Discrimination, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://tucson.com/news/local/us-supreme-court-says-mount-lemmon-fire-districtcan-be/article_9ad583e2-0ccd-5bf6-a51b-d9d71dfc6804.html.
See Barbara Perry et al., In Trump’s Court Pick, Who Won?, CABLE NEWS NETWORK
(July 10, 2018, 5:59 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/10/opinions/trump-secondsupreme-court-pick-opinion-roundup/index.html.
Collins, supra note 15.
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In the construction of the statutory or local laws of a state, it
is frequently necessary to re[fer] to the history and situation
of the country, in order to ascertain the reason, as well as the
meaning, of many of the provisions in them, to enable a
court to apply, with propriety, the different rules for
construing statutes.22
In interpreting a North Carolina statute, the Court relied on “a
legislative declaration, explaining and amending” the law at issue as
well as “the history and situation of the country at that time.”23 The
Court made clear in 1842 that “the journals of [C]ongress and of the
state legislatures are evidence” when reviewing and interpreting
statutes.24 In 1866, the Court reviewed drafting histories before
concluding that “it was the intention of Congress to subject the sales
made by brokers for themselves to the same duties as those made by
them for others . . . though it must be admitted their intention is
rather obscurely expressed.”25 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
accompanied by a unanimous court, found nothing untoward in 1911
about using legislative history to understand “the mind of Congress”
in order to interpret a statute.26 And by 1948, the Supreme Court
regularly reviewed “‘legislative reports and debates’ so as ‘to
indicate that the legislative mind.’”27
So by the 1970s, the Supreme Court had arrived at the comfortable,
accepted idea that interpreting statutes meant reviewing legislative
intent through textual and extratextual considerations to arrive at a
conclusion best serving the aims of the legislature, as understood
through examination of those considerations.28 Lest there be any
doubt, even in those cases highlighted in infamy for strident reliance
on exogenous evidence,29 the text remained a salient tool of statutory
interpretation.
For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court heard Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, a dispute about a federal
statute constraining the government’s ability to provide funding for
highways through areas designated as public parks.30 Justice
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Preston v. Browder, 14 U.S. 115, 121 (1816).
Id. at 123.
Watkins v. Lessee of Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 56 (1842).
United States v. Cutting, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 441, 444 (1865).
United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44–45 (1911).
Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418–20 (1948).
See Siegel, supra note 13.
See generally id.
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404–06 (1971).
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Thurgood Marshall offered an extensive review of the operative
legislative history in the case before concluding that the Court’s
analysis should focus “primarily” on the statutory text because of
ambiguities among the committee reports.31 In agreeing with the
government that the statute did not require the agency to provide
formal findings of fact before expending federal funds, Justice
Marshall never once suggested that reliance on the text was a last
resort otherwise to be forgotten.32 That legislative history does not
jettison the utility in reviewing the text was evident in Justice
Marshall’s often misunderstood opinion.33 Although the decision
was rife with discussions of and citations to certain legislative-history
documents and evidence,34 along with the statutes themselves,
nothing in the decision suggested that, as a default position, the text
should be subordinate to extratextual evidence. Dictionaries were not
discussed. Nor was the concept of common usage.
Justice Marshall’s analysis, joined by all justices, was couched in
terms of understanding “legislative intent,” but this phrase, at that
time, embodied interpreting the text through various tools rather than
attempting hermeneutics or some preternatural distillation of a
collective truth.35 Although the phrase seems well-nigh pejorative
now,36 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park encapsulates the current
position championed by Chief Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzman, in
which courts should consult extratextual sources to best understand
“how Congress works” and “what the legislative branch thinks is
important in understanding its statutes.”37 To do otherwise “impugns
Congress’s work process.”38
Toward the end of the decade, in another often-maligned case by
those who now disfavor extratextual considerations,39 the Supreme
Court in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York
considered whether a municipality could be a “person” subject to
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40 Justice William J. Brennan Jr.,
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 412 n.29.
See id. at 410–20.
Siegel, supra note 13.
See generally Citizens, 401 U.S. at 406.
See generally id.
Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783 n.* (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“For what it is worth, I seriously
doubt that a committee report is a ‘particularly reliable source’ for discerning
Congress’ intended meaning.’”).
Collins, supra note 15.
See id.
See Siegel, supra note 13.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 662 (1978).
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writing for the Court, overruled precedent and concluded, after “[a]
fresh analysis of the debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1871,” that
municipalities could be liable for civil-rights violations.41 The Court
devoted twenty-five pages to recounting congressional debates on the
issue, concluding that Congress “intend[ed]” municipalities to be
covered.42 Still, the majority made plain that the analysis should
“begin with the language of § 1983 as originally passed.”43 So, to
Justice Brennan, text always has a role in any interpretive analysis,
which cannot be divorced from other materials used to understand its
meaning.44 Even in dissent, then-Justice William H. Rehnquist
discussed and relied almost exclusively on legislative history and
extratextual evidence to argue that municipalities cannot be liable for
civil-rights violations.45 No justice brought up dictionaries or
common usage.
B. Legislative History Cannot Be Trusted
Although ascribing the success of a movement to any individual is
fraught and generally overlooks the contributions of others, at least
on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was one of the first to challenge
the efficacy of reviewing legislative history and extratextual
documents.46 And, as one of his many contributions during a nearly
thirty-year tenure on the Supreme Court, his arguments eventually
displaced as “almost unimaginable today” roughly two hundred years
of practice in arguments and decision-making.47 Justice Scalia’s
approach, most frequently referred to as textualism,48 has in effect
erased time and experience.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 664–65.
Id. at 665–90.
Id. at 691.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. at 720–23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Siegel, supra note 13.
See id.
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 030: Textualism, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON: LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 21, 2018), https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_theory_le_3.html; Lawrence B. Solum, Legal
Theory Lexicon 078: Theories of Statutory Interpretation and Construction, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON: LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Dec. 2, 2018), https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legal_theory_lexicon/2017/05/theories-of-statutory-interpretation.html; Kevin Walsh,
Tribute: Justice Scalia and the Next Generation of Constitutional Custodians,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2016, 11:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/
tribute-justice-scalia-and-the-next-generation-of-constitutional-custodians/.
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In Blanchard v. Bergeron, Justice Scalia questioned in 1989 the
Supreme Court’s reliance on legislative history on grounds that
legislative reports are unreliable and misleading guides to legislative
intent.49 In a separate opinion joined by no other justice, Justice
Scalia argued that committee reports had become “increasingly
unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of Congress actually
had in mind,” thereby implicitly accepting that a court should care to
some degree what members of Congress had in mind.50 He also
made plain his disdain for the prospect of a judicial practice that
motivates congressional staffers to pad the record with biased
evidence:
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of
congressional committee reports is well aware, the
references to the cases were inserted, at best by a committee
staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a
committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyerlobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not
primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill
meant (for that end Johnson would not merely have been
cited, but its 12 factors would have been described, which
they were not), but rather to influence judicial construction.
What a heady feeling it must be for a young staffer, to know
that his or her citation of obscure district court cases can
transform them into the law of the land, thereafter dutifully
to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.51
A few years later, in Conroy v. Aniskoff, Justice Scalia honed this
argument: “The greatest defect of legislative history is its
illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of
legislators.”52 His solo opinion did cite four legislative-history
excerpts “unearthed by a hapless law clerk to whom [he] assigned the
task.”53 Yet Justice Scalia leveled his view that when “language of
the statute is entirely clear,” legislative history should not be
consulted because “if [the clear result] is not what Congress meant
then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 98–99.
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 527.
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it.”54 The “hapless law clerk” to whom he assigned the case later
surfaced, remarking that reviewing legislative history was “beneath”
the justices as well as “work hardly fit even for a hapless law
clerk.”55
Justice Scalia crystalized his thoughts on textualism in 1995
through a series of lectures delivered at Princeton University, which
later appeared in book form.56 He complained about reliance of
legislative history, but that was one piece in a larger mosaic: “[T]he
text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.”57
Years later, Bilski v. Kappos, a 2010 case about whether a business
method can constitute a patentable “process,” instantiated a model for
textualism through its adoption by the other justices.58 Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the Court, declined to address the
history, policies, and background understandings of the patent
system, focusing instead on “dictionary definitions” and “common
usage” to understand the word “process.”59 The only reference to
legislative history came from a concurrence in judgment authored by
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen G. Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor.60
As textualism gained traction in the Supreme Court, the usage of
canons of statutory construction (i.e., generalized precepts to assist in
reading statutes) seemed to shift, turning the lens through which the
text is viewed from extratextual policy concerns to mantras like “the
people may rely on the original meaning of the written law.”61 A
five-justice majority during October Term 2017 seemed to capture
the zeitgeist of the moment with this statement: “Written laws are
meant to be understood and lived by. If a fog of uncertainty

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 528.
John Duffy, Tribute: Justice Scalia’s Hapless Law Clerk, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 6,
2016, 11:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/tribute-justice-scalias-haplesslaw-clerk/.
See Siegel, supra note 13.
Id.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 598, 602 (2010).
Id. at 601–03.
See id. at 641–42 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018); Encino Motorcars,
LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (“We reject this principle as a useful
guidepost for interpreting the FLSA. Because the FLSA gives no ‘textual indication’
that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no reason to give [them]
anything other than a fair (rather than a “narrow”) interpretation.’” (citation omitted)).
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surrounded them, if their meaning could shift with the latest judicial
whim, the point of reducing them to writing would be lost.”62
As Bilski and later decisions demonstrate, the hallmarks of a
textualist opinion include resisting the temptation to find textual
ambiguity, while eschewing legislative history, intent, pragmatism,
historical context, and analogous or adjoining precedent; the opinion
instead should follow a familiar path of reciting the text, analyzing
grammar, referencing dictionaries, and briefly rebutting practical
counterarguments against a conclusion already drawn from the
proceeding analysis of foreordained clear text.63
President Donald J. Trump has accelerated the role of textualism as
the principal driver in statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court
by making it part of a litmus test for any nominee.64 Justice Neil M.
Gorsuch was not shy in attesting to his fealty to this approach as a
circuit judge—even questioning outright whether legislative intent
could ever be discerned.65 Nor was Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh
timid in his views, espousing thoughts on occasion akin to Justice
Scalia.66
Despite textualism’s momentum in the Supreme Court, the federal
courts of appeals have been slow adopters, and even skeptics, of a
regimented approach to interpreting federal statutes.67
After
surveying forty-two federal courts of appeals judges, Circuit Judge
62.
63.

64.
65.

66.

67.

Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074.
See, e.g., Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 1140 (citing a dictionary definition to
ascertain “ordinary meaning”). See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 368 (2018).
Our analysis starts with the phrase ‘critical habitat.’ According to
the ordinary understanding of how adjectives work, ‘critical
habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’ Adjectives modify nouns—they
pick out a subset of a category that possesses a certain quality. It
follows that ‘critical habitat’ is the subset of ‘habitat’ that is
‘critical’ to the conservation of an endangered species.
Id.
Perry et al., supra note 20.
Kevin Russell, Judge Gorsuch on Separation of Powers and Federalism,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2017, 3:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judgegorsuch-separation-powers-federalism/ (“And guesses about legislative intentions are,
as we’ve seen, never a proper basis for overruling plain statutory language.”).
Edith Roberts, Potential Nominee Profile: Brett Kavanaugh, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2018, 5:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/potential-nominee-profile-brettkavanaugh/ (“Perhaps because of his years of executive-branch experience,
Kavanaugh generally brings a pragmatic approach to judging, although his judicial
philosophy is conservative, and he has applied principles of textualism and
originalism espoused by the late Justice Antonin Scalia.”).
Gluck & Posner, supra note 11, at 1343–48.
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Richard A. Posner and Professor Abbe R. Gluck found that none
endorsed textualism outright and all consulted legislative history:
None of the forty-two judges whom we interviewed—
judges from across the political and theoretical spectrum—
was willing to associate himself or herself with “textualism”
without qualification. All consult legislative history. Many
eschew dictionaries. Many of them utilize at least some
canons of construction, but for reasons that range from
“window dressing,” to canons as vehicles of opinion
writing, to a view that they are actually useful decision
tools.68
The authors also discovered that “the judges [they] spoke to are
willing to consider many different kinds of material” because it is
“defensible to gather as much information as you can to make the
best-informed decision you can.”69
Even so, as textualism has gained greater purchase in the legal
mainstream, circuit splits have inevitably formed as this once-nascent
movement cleaves newer decisions from those applying the methods
of old.70 Mount Lemmon demonstrates how a circuit split can occur
subtly through interpretative-regime displacement.
III. MOUNT LEMMON AND THE TRIUMPH OF TEXTUALIST
DISPLACEMENT
A. How U.S. Circuit Courts Interpreted the ADEA Amid the Rise of
Textualism
In many ways, interpretations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 grew up alongside the emergence of
textualism.71 The ADEA sought to protect workers against “arbitrary
age discrimination.”72 As originally enacted, both Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA “imposed liability on
‘employer[s],’ defined in both statutes as ‘a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce’ whose employees met a numerical
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1302.
Id.
See Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 25 (2018) (“Federal courts
have divided on this question.”).
See Sandra F. Sperino, Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107,
1112–14 (2014).
29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2012).
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threshold,” all while excluding governmental entities from that
definition and thus liability.73
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to reach state and local
employers with fifteen or more employees by changing the definition
of who is a “person”: “The term ‘person’ includes one or more
individuals, governments, governmental agencies, [and] political
subdivisions.”74 The definition of “person” then rolled into the
definition of “employer”: “The term ‘employer’ means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees . . . .”75
Congress amended the ADEA two years later to address its import
on state and local governments.76 But unlike Title VII, in which
Congress added those entities to the definition of “person,” in the
ADEA, Congress added them to the definition of “employer”:
The term “employer” means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more
employees . . . . The term also means (1) any agent of such
a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State . .
. .77
In that same 1974 enactment, Congress amended the Fair Labor
Standards Act, on which parts of the ADEA had been modeled, to
reach government employers regardless of their size.78 Running
concurrent with the gradual acceptance of textualism, courts began to
interpret whether the numerical requirement of twenty employees
applied to state and local governments under the ADEA.
In 1986, the Seventh Circuit, in Kelly v. Wauconda Park District,
concluded that the numerical requirement applied to state and local
employers because “the legislative histories of both the ADEA and
Title VII amendments indicate that Congress’s main purpose in
amending the statutes was to put public and private employers on the
same footing.”79 Circuit Judge Harlington Wood Jr. concluded that
the statute is “ambiguous,” which compelled the appellate court to
review holistically the text, various statements in the congressional
record, and analogous precedent on how to interpret employment-law
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 24–25 (citations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976).
Id. § 2000e(b).
Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2012).
See id. § 203(d) (2012).
Kelly v. Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1986).
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statutes.80 The decision was devoid of any evaluation of common
usage, instead applying “common sense” to understand congressional
intent.81 And although the panel made just one reference to a
dictionary definition for the term “also,” it explained that “there are
dangers in attempting to rely too heavily on characterizations such as
‘disjunctive’ form versus ‘conjunctive’ form to resolve difficult
issues of statutory construction.”82 Judge Wood concluded with a
pragmatic argument that nothing in the legislative history suggested
that Congress sought to impose greater liability for age
discrimination, as compared to the numerically restricted areas of
racial, sexual, and religious discrimination under Title VII.83
The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in 1990, observing
that the text is “ambiguous” and that “the legislative history of the
statute indicates that the twenty employee statutory minimum
applicable to private employers is likewise applicable to government
employers.”84 Circuit Judge James Leo Ryan was succinct:
The legislative history clearly expresses the intention that
public sector employees are to be treated the same as private
sector employees for purposes of the ADEA and, therefore,
since the twenty employee minimum applies to private
sector employees, Congress must have intended the twenty
employee minimum requirement to apply to public sector
employees.85
The decision contained no references to dictionaries, the concept of
common usage, or grammatical considerations.
Eight years later, the Eight Circuit joined these ranks, concluding
that the statute is “ambiguous” and that “[t]he legislative history of §
630(b)(2) shows that in adding agencies and instrumentalities to the
ADEA definition of an employer, Congress intended to ‘treat both
public and private employers alike, with “one set of rules”’ applying
to both.”86

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. 270–72.
See id. at 272–73.
Id. at 270 n.1 (citation omitted).
Id. at 273.
EEOC v. Monclova Twp., 920 F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 363.
Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
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In 2015, the Tenth Circuit, relying on these precedents, accepted
the numerical requirement in a footnote without much discussion.87
Rather than reciting legislative history or other extratextual evidence,
Chief Circuit Judge Timothy Tymkovich “adopt[ed] that view”
simpliciter, acknowledging that the other appellate decisions were
“based on legislative history showing a general intent to treat
government and private employers the same.”88
Although the analysis varied over time, a circuit split did not
emerge until 2017, when the Ninth Circuit, perennially maligned by
President Trump for ostensibly “liberal” outcomes,89 adopted a
textualist approach to understanding the ADEA.90
B. Textualist Displacement on Display
Mount Lemmon has its genesis in a decision by the fire chief of
Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision in Arizona, to
lay off its two oldest fulltime firefighters, John Guido (then 46) and
Dennis Rankin (then 54) to resolve a budget shortfall.91 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which long had maintained
that the ADEA covers state and local employers of any size, found
reasonable cause to believe that the fire district had discriminated on
the basis of age.92 So the firefighters sued in 2013 on allegations that
the fire district violated the ADEA.93 In view of the uniform
consensus among appellate courts in other circuits, the district court
unsurprisingly granted summary judgment to the fire district on the
basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the
ADEA.94
Against a redoubt of unbroken precedent in one direction, the
Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in 2017,
87.
88.
89.

90.

91.
92.

93.
94.

See Cink v. Grant Cty., 635 F. App’x 470, 474 n.5 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Lyle Denniston, Chief Justice, President in a Public Feud, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Nov.
22, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/chief-justice-president-in-a-public-feud
(“The President has been regularly a critic of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which has a reputation of being the most liberal tribunal in the federal court
system.”).
See Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist., 859 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (“As a
matter of plain meaning, the argument that § 630(b) can be reasonably interpreted to
include its second sentence definitions within its first is underwhelming.”).
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 24 (2018).
Charlotte Garden, Argument Preview: Age Discrimination and Small Public
Employers, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 24, 2018, 1:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/09/argument-preview-age-discrimination-and-small-public-employers/.
Guido, 859 F.3d at 1170.
Id.
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concluding that the ADEA is “not ambiguous,” and that “[t]he
twenty-employee minimum does not apply to definitions in the
second sentence and there is no reason to depart from the statute’s
plain meaning.”95 Writing for the panel, Senior Circuit Judge
Diarmuid O’Scannlain recited dictionary definitions to arrive at an
understanding that the word “‘also’ is a ‘term of enhancement,’”
which means it “adds another definition to a previous definition of a
term—it does not clarify the previous definition.”96 “As a matter of
plain meaning,” Judge O’Scannlain continued, “the argument that §
630(b) can be reasonably interpreted to include its second sentence
definitions within its first is underwhelming.”97 The appeals court
also rejected any notion that “common sense” should apply in this
type of analysis because “any appeal to congressional intent is a nonsequitur” that does not “affect the determination of whether a
statute’s plain meaning is ambiguous.”98 Judge O’Scannlain’s brief
discussion of legislative history only occurred at the end of the
opinion in a section serving as an alternative basis to support the
panel’s textualist conclusion.99 The Ninth Circuit concluded by
observing that “it is not our role to choose what we think is the best
policy outcome and to override the plain meaning of a statute,
apparent anomalies or not.”100 This counterintuitive result, when
measured against judicial consensus reaching the opposite
conclusion, bears all the hallmarks of an instance of textualist
displacement.
The fire district thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari on
the issue of numerosity, which the Supreme Court granted to the
Ninth Circuit in February 2018.101 The briefs on the merits focused
on how the text of the ADEA and other statutes support their
positions.102 With the support of the U.S. Solicitor General, the
firefighters argued that the term “also” creates three unambiguous
groups of employers subject to liability: “private employers with at
least [twenty] employees; their agents; and state and local employers

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1174 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. at 1174–75.
Id. at 1175.
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 859 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138
S. Ct. 1165 (Feb. 26, 2018) (No. 17-587).
102. See Garden, supra note 92.
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of any size.”103 The fire district countered that “also” acts as “a
transitional phrase that signifies amplification or clarification,” rather
than defining a wholly new category of employer.104 The fire district
added that including “agents” as an independent category of
“employer” is “unfathomable” because that would impose
Maintaining
independent liability on those individuals.105
consistently between Title VII and the ADEA furthers congressional
goals in this area, the fire district continued, which provides a space
for large-office accountability without the threat of impairing smallemployer operations.106 Professor Charlotte Garden suggested ahead
of oral argument that “[t]he fire district’s main challenge seems likely
to be convincing the court to look beyond the most intuitive reading
of [the statutory] words.”107
The Court heard the case on the first day of October Term 2018.108
An eight-member bench assembled due to the vacancy created by
Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the pending confirmation of Justice
Kavanaugh.109 E. Joshua Rosenkranz, whose name was initially
misspelled “Rosenberg” in the Court’s day call for arguing
lawyers,110 represented the fire district and faced tough questioning
on all sides.111 Justice Gorsuch suggested that it made no sense to
deviate from the “normal meaning” of the word “also.”112 Both
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justice Sotomayor made clear
that they shared this view.113 In contrast, Jeffrey Fisher, representing
the firefighters, and Jonathan Bond, arguing on behalf of the
government, encountered little resistance for the proposition that
“also” is used in both everyday conversation and federal statutes to
“add[] something that wasn’t there before.”114 Rosenkranz exhorted

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Opening with an Empty Spot on the
Bench, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 1, 2018, 4:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/
a-view-from-the-courtroom-opening-with-an-empty-spot-on-the-bench/.
Id.
Id.
Charlotte Garden, Argument Analysis: “A Strange Statute that was Written in a
Strange Way,” SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2018, 10:51 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2018/10/argument-analysis-a-strange-statute-that-was-written-in-a-strange-way/.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that “[t]his is a strange statute that was written in a strange way.”115
But, as Professor Garden predicted, “[a]n outcome that relies on a
plain-language reading of ‘also means’ to decide the case in the
employees’ favor seems likely.”116
C. Mount Lemmon Embodies the Court’s Shift in Thinking on
Statutory Interpretation
In the first opinion of October Term 2018, just over one month
after oral argument, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit, concluding that “the text of the ADEA’s definitional
provision, also its kinship to the FLSA and differences from Title
VII, leave scant room for doubt that state and local governments are
‘employer[s]’ covered by the ADEA regardless of their size.”117 In a
slip opinion barely crossing over onto a seventh page, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous eight-member bench, emphasized
that “[f]irst and foremost, the ordinary meaning of ‘also means’ is
additive rather than clarifying.”118 Hewing to the text, she explained
that it would be “so strange” to impose a numerical requirement in
one portion of the sentence for governments, while declining to do
the same for agents in the other portion: “Its construction, however,
would lift that restriction for the agent portion of the second sentence,
and then reimpose it for the portion of that sentence addressing States
and their political subdivisions.”119
Rejecting arguments that Title VII and the ADEA should have
uniform application, Justice Ginsburg commented that “this disparity
is a consequence of the different language Congress chose to
employ.”120 “The better comparator is the FLSA,” she observed,
which defines states and political subdivisions as “employer[s]”
irrespective of their number of employees.121 The Court made slight
reference to some practical concerns in the opinion’s penultimate
paragraph, suggesting that “experience” evinced “[n]o untoward
service shrinkages” from the threat of liability.122 And the opinion
made no mention of common-sense arguments, legislative history

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 27 (2018).
Id. at 25.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
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(despite its extensive reliance by circuit courts for decades), the
historical context of the ADEA and Title VII, or congressional intent.
Mount Lemmon generated little coverage, scholarly or otherwise.123
One article suggested that smaller school districts could be
impacted.124 Another, written by an amicus curiae in support of the
fire district, remarked that the Court rejected its “policy arguments”
that rural areas could become vulnerable to litigation because “few
alternatives [exist] to layoffs and terminations when budget cuts must
be made.”125 The overwhelming consensus was that Mount Lemmon
was a workmanlike decision with little on which to comment.126
That Mount Lemmon received little fanfare proves just how far
textualism has come, and at least three reasons demonstrate why the
decision bears latent, almost sub rosa, importance. Most striking is
how different the Court approached the question presented in Mount
Lemmon when compared to courts just a few years ago. In the
context of the ADEA, thirty years of precedent had concluded that
the numerical requirement was ambiguous, necessitating review of
extratextual sources.127 What changed in 2018? Certainly different
judges and justices are deciding the cases, but a lack of bald
ideological valance in Mount Lemmon suggests that the method of
interpretation mattered and is cardinal. As compared to Monell and
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, the style and methodology
employed in Mount Lemmon could not be more divergent.128 An
educated person without legal training most likely would conclude
that the Court had been asked to do different things, which required
performing different tasks. Nothing about those cases, or the court of
appeals cases leading up to Mount Lemmon, maps onto how the
123. Roberts, supra note 10.
124. Mark Walsh, Supreme Court Says Federal Age-Bias Law Applies to Local
Governments of Any Size, EDUC. WEEK (Nov. 6, 2018, 1:08 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law/2018/11/supreme_court_rules_that_feder
.html (“Most school districts tend to be quite large employers in their communities.
But some regular districts with fewer than 20 employees likely exist, as do certain
administrative or special-purpose school districts that may have light employment
rosters.”).
125. Lisa Soronen, Supreme Court Rules Against State and Local Governments in Age
Discrimination Case, COUNCIL STATE GOV’T. (Nov. 6, 2018, 3:17 PM), http://know
ledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/supreme-court-rules-against-state-and-localgovernment-age-discrimination-case.
126. Roberts, supra note 10.
127. Compare Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1971),
with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664–65 (1978).
128. Compare Citizens, 401 U.S. at 411–12, and Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–65, with Mount
Lemmon Fire Dist. v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22, 23 (2018).
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Supreme Court approached its decision in 2018. Gone are references
to intent, non-final legislative documents, practical considerations,
and a wink to common sense. All of that has been replaced by
grammar exegeses and dictionary citations.129 Although the text
played a role before, it is now the germane player on a team in a
game that has evolved apace in just thirty years. And while some
have questioned whether the Supreme Court can prescribe a certain
method of statutory interpretation that would be binding on the lower
courts, it does not need to if it in effect ignores extratextual
arguments in favor of preferred methods.130
The second lesson of Mount Lemmon is how advocates must
approach statutory-interpretation cases in the Supreme Court.131
Textualism forces, as the primary (and perhaps only) argument, an
explanation about why the text supports a particular position.132
Although the reasoning of similar precedent holds currency, reciting
dictionary definitions is nigh mandatory in the Supreme Court in
these types of cases. Also, an understanding of how basic
grammatical principles affect an argument is invaluable.133
Referencing canons of statutory construction, particularly those
identified in Reading Law by Justice Scalia and Professor Bryan
Garner,134 can help salve the edges of an argument, especially when
an argument is supported by the maxim “words generally should be
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 23.
Gluck & Posner, supra note 11 at 1343–48.
See Mount Lemmon, 139 S. Ct. at 25–26.
See id. at 26–27.
See, e.g., Jennifer Chacon, Argument Analysis: Are There Limits to the Government’s
Power to Detain Immigrants Without a Hearing?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2018, 7:37
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/argument-analysis-are-there-limits-to-thegovernments-power-to-detain-immigrants-without-a-hearing/.
But an entertaining exchange between Gorsuch and Wang about
grammar (in which Wang won kudos from the justice) suggested
that Gorsuch has at least some sympathy for Preap’s statutory
construction argument, even if he is not yet completely
convinced. And when Gorsuch pressed Tripp on whether there
were ‘any limits on the government’s power’ under the
government’s reading of the statute, it was reminiscent of the
concerns about government overreach that Gorsuch signaled last
term in Sessions v. Dimaya, in which he also came down in favor
of the immigrant.
Id.
134. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 247–340 (2012).
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. . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.”135 Extratextual canons
on the other hand, such as the presumption that exemptions from
complying with fair-labor practices should be construed narrowly,136
seem to be losing favor in the Supreme Court, unless the dispute
involves upholding the primacy of the Federal Arbitration Act over
other laws and practices.137
Anticipating a reluctance to find ambiguity perforce leaves a small
window to argue away from the text. And if the text does not support
a favored position, good reasons must exist to resort to external
documents and intent-laden arguments. Perhaps pragmatism and
consequentialism still have value in the appropriate context, as when
Chief Justice Roberts, for example, salvaged a statute of immense
national economic importance: “Congress passed the Affordable
Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.
If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent
with the former, and avoids the latter.”138 Still, in the ordinary case,
extratextual arguments fall behind the predetermined attention that
the text now demands.139 No doubt if it were possible to transport
and swap advocates from the 1970s with today, both sets would be
ill-equipped to advance arguments in what assuredly would be a
foreign place. With the stakes just as high, the game probably would
not make a dram of sense to either side. But when, as now, the Court

135. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (quotation marks
omitted) (ellipses omitted) (citation omitted).
136. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 (2018) (“We reject this
principle as a useful guidepost for interpreting the FLSA. Because the FLSA gives no
‘textual indication’ that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, ‘there is no
reason to give [them] anything other than a fair (rather than a “narrow”)
interpretation.’” (citation omitted)).
137. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1648–49 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
If these untoward consequences stemmed from legislative
choices, I would be obliged to accede to them. But the edict that
employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only oneby-one does not come from Congress. It is the result of take-it-orleave-it labor contracts harking back to the type called ‘yellow
dog,’ and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those
unbargained-for agreements.
The FAA demands no such
suppression of the right of workers to take concerted action for
their ‘mutual aid or protection.’
Id.
138. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
139. See supra notes 117–32 and accompanying text.
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gives you textualism, saddle in because “we’re all textualists” at that
point.140
A third lesson from Mount Lemmon is that textualism can
sometimes produce progressive outcomes. Assuming progressive
values support empowering those aggrieved of employment
discrimination with the ability to litigate against a broader range of
employers, Mount Lemmon achieved that goal by affording the
firefighters an opportunity to bring their case.141 The displacement of
a panoply of extratextual sources in favor of reliance on text alone, to
be sure, changes the game significantly in most circumstances—but
the upshot for progressives is not necessarily transitioning from the
tennis court to a rendezvous in the gladiatorial coliseum. A more apt
analogy might be, in close cases, like changing sports from basketball
to baseball. Michael Jordon had marginal success in his attempt to
play baseball in the minor leagues, but he still played ball and hit a
homerun three times.142 So obvious value exists for progressives to
adopt a fake-it-until-you-make-it attitude on textualism.143 It is
moreover too soon to tell how textualism, once properly embraced by
litigants in their briefing, will affect litigation. Also, although the
wind is at textualism’s back right now, there is no guarantee that a
shift in direction could not be in the offing.144 And when all else
fails, as Justice Brennan commended during a speech at the Playboy
Great Gorge Resort in Vernon, New Jersey, litigants can always try
their luck in state court under state law.145
Mount Lemmon, all told, makes manifest that textualism matters
now more than ever. And this abrupt change of circumstances, at
least when compared to how courts have approached cases from the
140. See The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
supra note 1.
141. Cf. Ronald Collins, Ask the Author: Adler and Others on “Business and the Roberts
Court,” SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 28, 2016, 4:53 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/11/ask-the-author-adler-and-others-on-business-and-the-roberts-court/; Roselyn
Miller, Seattle Considers a Domestic Workers Bill of Rights, SLATE (June 29, 2018,
10:00 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/06/domestic-workers-bill-of-rightsin-seattle-is-most-progressive-attempt-at-protection-yet.html.
142. See Michael Jordan, BASEBALL REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/reg
ister/player.fcgi?id=jordan001mic (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
143. See Stern, supra note 19.
144. See In Recess #9: “Hoofbeats in the Distance,” FIRST MONDAYS (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://simplecast.com/s/3076452a.
145. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students: Justice William Brennan and Supreme
Court Avoidance, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 21, 2018, 2:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2018/11/scotus-for-law-students-justice-william-brennan-and-supreme-courtavoidance/.
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founding through the 1970s, deserves respect and is here to stay for
the foreseeable future.
IV. CONCLUSION
If “we’re all textualists now,” Mount Lemmon helps us understand
the breadth and scope of that charge.146 Yet Mount Lemmon also
represents a validation of a cause and a recognition of what types of
arguments now matter to the Supreme Court and what has become de
minimis.147 Whether halcyon days are ahead or left in the past
depends, at least partially, on whether you are an optimist or
pessimist. No doubt leading an argument headfirst with legislative
history is a poor decision. And ignoring the particularities of
grammar comes at one’s peril.148 Still, although today’s opinions
look nothing like opinions from, frankly, the past 200 years, the
playing field can still produce victories for progressives bracing the
textualist revolution.149
Each revolution is a product of its
predecessor’s demise. And whether one revolution has staying
power over another depends, in some circumstances, on the ability to
persuade and attract acceptance. Textualism started with solo
concurrences.150 For those not troubled by learning about a statute
through as many sources as possible before reaching a decision, 200
years of precedent provides a reference point from which to
reinvigorate the debate—even if done one case at a time.

146. See The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
supra note 1.
147. See supra Part I.
148. See, e.g., Chacon, supra note 133.
149. See Stern, supra note 19.
150. See supra Section II.B.

